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In light of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' recent
appointment of the Accounting Objectives Study Group to formulate the
objectives of financial statements, some questions were raised regarding the
propriety of regulating accounting information through specifying the objectives of financial statements. Arguments were put forth stating that, in view
of the generally demonstrated efficiency of the marketplace, Adam Smith's
invisible hand will cause the appropriate kind and quantity of accounting
information to be communicated; and that therefore the regulation of accounting information by a group of interested preparers and users will be wasteful.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether—in view of the theory of,
and the empirical findings related to, efficient markets—there is a justification
for the specification of accounting objectives.
The first part of this paper discusses the implications of the efficient
market hypothesis and its related research with respect to the choice of a
"best" accounting system. The second part is addressed to the question of
whether there exist market incentives for firms to produce an optimal amount
of accounting information which would eliminate the need for regulation. The
issue is examined first by assuming that no disclosure laws exist, and then
the existing disclosure laws are explicitly taken into consideration.
The Implications of Efficient Market Research
On the Choice Among Accounting Alternatives
Recent research effort in accounting 1 centers on the implications of the
efficient market hypothesis and the empirical capital market research for
1
Ray Ball and Philip Brown, " A n Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers," Journal of Accounting
Research (Autumn 1968), pp. 159-178. W. Beaver, P.
Kettler, and M. Scholes, "The Association Between Accounting Information and
Market Valuation of Securities," Accounting
Review (October 1970), pp. 654-682.
William H. Beaver, " T h e Behavior of Security Prices and Its Implications for Accounting
Research (Methods)," Supplement to the Accounting
Review (1972), pp. 407-437.
R. E. Dukes, "Market Evaluation of Alternative Accounting Information Systems"
(Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University). Nicholas J. Gonedes, "Efficient Capital
Markets and External A c c o u n t i n g , " Accounting
Review (January 1972), pp. 11-21.
L. L. Lookabill, " A Study of the Relationship Between Accounting Information and
Market Valuation of Securities" (Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University).
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choosing among accounting alternatives. For example, it is stated that
"observations of the market reactions of recipients of accounting outputs
should govern evaluations of the actual informational content of accounting
numbers produced via a given set of procedures and the informational content of accounting numbers2 produced via an alternative set of accounting
procedures." The underlying contention is that in the context of competitive
and efficient markets, transactors in the aggregate will not react to accounting
information 3 unless the accounting numbers have informational content. 4
Not much harm is caused by the assertion that when accounting numbers
are used (as manifested in movement of stock prices), they have informational
content. This is descriptive of a definition of what constitutes informational
content and of actual phenomena, i.e., movement of stock prices. When it is
asserted, however, that market reactions should govern the evaluation of
accounting alternatives, the underlying implication is that when accounting
numbers are used (i.e., the market reacts to them) they are also useful in the
sense of satisfying the objectives of accounting. The problem with this
approach is that it uses a definition and the manifested results of a descriptive process to make a normative judgment (that market reactions should
govern the evaluation of accounting alternatives).
The assertion that market reactions should govern the evaluation of
accounting alternatives is primarily justified by acknowledging that—assuming that individuals are rational and that markets are efficient (as defined and
shown in the efficient market literature)—one cannot expect the market to
react unless accounting information is useful. However, the kind of usefulness that should be inferred from (a) the proposition that individuals are
rational and from (b) the findings that markets adjust efficiently and unbiasedly to information, may not necessarily be the kind of usefulness that
we might care to require from accounting information.
Evaluation of Usefulness
In Light of Accounting Objectives
Certainly, the kind of usefulness that is desired can be derived only from
the objectives of accounting. For example, if among the criteria or objectives
2

Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External A c c o u n t i n g , " p. 12.

3

Reaction to accounting information is generally measured via movements in the
stock price through which the aggregate behavior of market transactors is manifested.
4
Informational content of accounting output is usually implicitly defined as those
attributes of the accounting output that trigger market reaction. For example, Ball &
Brown argue, "If, as the evidence indicates, security prices do in fact adjust rapidly
to new information as it becomes available, the changes in security prices will reflect
the flow of information to the market. An observed revision of stock prices associated
with the release of the income report would thus provide evidence that the information
reflected in income numbers is useful." (Ball and Brown, " A n Empirical Evaluation of
Accounting income Numbers," pp. 160-161.)
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of accounting there is listed the efficiency in resource allocation and perhaps
some criteria relative to the distribution of wealth, 5 it may be discovered that
the kind of usefulness inferred from market reactions does not necessarily
satisfy these two objectives. In other words, the kind of market equilibrium
consistent with presently available accounting information and the degree of
efficiency of the market's reaction to this kind of information may not necessarily be the desired equilibrium. (Note that equilibrium is a descriptive
phenomenon and not in itself an indication that some normative criterion has
been satisfied.) Thus, the manifestations of a present equilibrium which may
be undesirable cannot be used as a normative criterion for choosing the
accounting alternative which best satisfies an objective. The satisfaction of
the specified objective may well require a different kind of market equilibrium
which—if extant—would produce entirely different manifestations.
To put things somewhat differently, imagine that there are two market
equilibrium systems, A and B, and two distinct systems of accounting procedures resulting in sets of accounting signals X and Y, respectively. Then
assume that X and Y are evaluated on the basis of the market's reactions.
Suppose it turns out that under system A the market reacts to X but not to
(thus indicating that X, and not Y, has informational content) while under
system 3, the market reacts to Y but not to X (thus implying that Y, and not X,
has informational content). Which is the better accounting system? Clearly,
in this situation the market reaction is not a sufficient criterion. There is still
open the question of which equilibrium system, A or B, better serves the
objectives. This illustration could also be applied over time rather than across
market systems. Presumably, a different market equilibrium system existed
100 years ago and the accounting system undoubtedly was somewhat different from today's practice. How can the two systems be evaluated if the
market reacted to both systems? How can a descriptive phenomenon be
used to make normative judgments? 6
Exploration of the descriptive phenomenon is valuable in understanding
the market mechanism and in generating hypotheses about the nature of
decision-making in the marketplace. The descriptive phenomenon is also
useful in testing the implications of hypotheses about how decisions are
made in the marketplace. However, it cannot be the sole test of which

5
While the means of achieving allocation of resources in the economy are subject
to debate, probably none would question the desirability of efficient resource allocation
as a goal. As to equity criteria relative to the distribution of wealth, they are clearly
implicit as objectives. For example, Rules 10b-5, 10b-6 and Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Court rulings in the Texas Gulf case relate to insider
trading and the disclosure of information.
6
Indeed, it may be argued that technological changes modify the nature of the
equilibrium over time. The proposition of an accounting alternative whose test of
usefulness is not derived from extant equilibrium can be viewed as a technological
change in itself.
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accounting alternative better satisfies our goals and should therefore be
preferred. The appropriate test should depend, among other things, on prespecified accounting objectives. 7
The Argument That Accounting Operates
In a Competitive Context
The contention that accounting alternatives should be evaluated on the
basis of market reactions is partially defended on the grounds that the
accounting process provides information only in a competitive context and
that there are alternative sources of information that investors could use.8 The
contention that accounting operates in a competitive context is based on (a)
the assumption that accounting numbers include information that reflects
economy-wide events and industry-wide events that can also be obtained
from other indicators such as industrial production reports and national
income reports, and (b) the evidence of the existence of anticipatory price
movements that precede the announcement of accounting numbers. 9 Thus,
it is argued that if there were no other sources competing with accounting
information, one would expect to observe rapid price movements when
accounting data are disseminated. As a result, it is postulated that ". . .
market transactors in the aggregate do not blindly accept and use accounting numbers only" and therefore "the market's reaction to accounting numbers (e.g., the anticipatory reactions noted above) provides reliable indication
of accounting numbers' informational content." 10
There are several problems with these contentions. Alternative sources
of information with respect to economy- and industry-wide events that affect
the value of the firm may well exist, but the likelihood of alternative sources
of information about the existence of a firm's specific events is minimal. It is
indeed possible that the latter does exist since such events usually constitute
transactions involving other entities which, potentially, could provide the information. However, the cost of reconstructing the firm's specific events from
numerous and possibly scattered sources is probably prohibitive. As a result,
such a reconstruction of events may not be undertaken by investors since

7
A framework for the formulation of accounting objectives is discussed by the author
in " A User Oriented Development of Accounting Information Requirements," pp. 80103, this volume.
8
See, e.g., Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External A c c o u n t i n g , " p. 14:
" I n particular it appears that the accounting p r o c e s s — q u a supplier of information—
does not possess strict monopoly power over the supply of information pertinent to the
evaluation of a firm. Instead, it appears that the accounting process—qua supplier of
information—functions within a competitive context."
9
For example, Ball and Brown, " A n Empirical Evaluation of Accounting
Numbers."
10

Income

Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External A c c o u n t i n g , " p. 16.
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the cost may exceed the perceived benefits.11 Thus, if some firm-specific
information is not provided by the firm, even if it is available in the market it
may not be used. This fact is consistent with an efficient market in which
transaction costs are assumed to exist.
Moreover, a market equilibrium in which transactors do not seek information because of the high cost of search, even when they know that it exists,
is consistent with the evidence collected about efficient markets. And when
accounting information is provided about firms' specific events for which
alternative sources of information are too costly to seek out, transactors are
justified in relying on the accounting information.
Thus, if it is found that transactors accept and use accounting numbers
(this phenomenon has occasionally been referred to as functional fixation, 12
although the term has never been rigorously defined), this does not necessarily imply that they do so blindly. Use of the accounting numbers by
transactors may be explained by one or both of the following propositions:
1. In equilibrium, investors rely on accounting information whenever the
cost of seeking alternative sources about the same events exceeds the benefits of searching. This is likely to be the case in particular with respect to
firms' specific events.13 Thus investors' reliance on accounting information
does not imply that they do so blindly, but rather that they make rational
decisions about when to stop seeking information.
2. The accounting system is a vehicle for management to communicate
its expectations about the firm's cash flows, and it is likely that investors view
accounting information as a surrogate for management expectations which
they utilize since there are no alternative sources.
A social organization that requires firms to report probably results from
an implicit decision based on information economics. Delegation of the information provision function to the firm makes sense if the firm can produce
the information at a lower cost than outsiders. This is consistent with the
evidence that accounting information is anticipated through price move-

11
This is consistent with the phenomenon, for example, that in some developing
countries the state enforces the disclosure of minimal accounting information (apparently because individuals find it too costly to produce the information themselves).
Turkey is a case in point. See Var Turgut, " T h e Turkish Uniform Accounting Plan,"
(Unpublished manuscript, University of Kansas).
12
Yuji Ijiri, Robert K. Jaedicke, and Kenneth E. Knight, " T h e Effects of Accounting
Alternatives on Management Decisions," Research in Accounting
Measurement,
edited
by Robert K. Jaedicke, Yuji Ijiri, and Oswald Nielson (Evanston, III.: American Accounting Association, 1966).
13
The cost to the firm of processing information about its specific events and transactions is probably lower because of scale economies. While no evidence exists on
this hypothesis, it is clearly empirically testable. It is also consistent with the observation that the SEC and other governmental agencies increasingly require more accounting information to be disseminated. To provide evidence against this hypothesis, it
must be shown, for example, that anticipatory market reaction is caused solely through
sources other than the firm and that the anticipatory reaction explains all reaction to
accounting information (which has yet to be shown).
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merits prior to the announcement date. There probably exist cheaper outside
sources for information about economy-wide and industry-wide information
that are tapped in advance of the announcement of accounting information. Some firm-specific events could also be anticipated as a result of
announcements by the firms' managements through releases issued by
market newsletter services and through reports by the firm to the SEC, etc.
These "leakages," however, all come from the firm itself and could well be
viewed as part of its information or accounting system. In fact, it might be
advisable to incorporate such announcements formally into the accounting
system, since they would then be subject to audit and verification.
In sum, the existing evidence on efficient markets may well be viewed
as being consistent with the following statement: Market transactors, in the
aggregate, accept and use accounting numbers as well as any additional
information that they can obtain at reasonable search costs. Had accounting
numbers not been provided, market reactions might have been different since
the information contained in accounting numbers might then have been too
costly to obtain elsewhere. Thus, market reactions alone do not provide a
criterion for evaluating information alternatives.
In particular, individuals' reliance on accounting numbers does not indicate irrationality or psychological conditioning. Rather, it may reflect rationality within the context of a competitive market in which information is costly
and in which expectations about the value of different data are heterogeneous.
Individual rationality is thus consistent both with the reliance on accounting
data (without testing their informational content through seeking other
sources), and with a competitive equilibrium that assumes costly information
and heterogeneous expectations. And while the evidence from the efficient
market research (both the weak and the semi-strong form) is consistent with
that efficient market hypothesis which assumes costless information and
homogeneous expectations, it is also consistent with an efficient market
hypothesis that assumes costly information and heterogeneous expectations. 14
The Argument That Stock Prices Eventually
Reflect "Inside Information"
Finally, the argument is usually made that market reaction is a reliable
indicator since it impounds any existing information, even that not made
publicly available. It is contended that since there must be at least one
person possessing the information who recognizes the inefficiencies that
result from its nonpublic availability, he would—being rational—exploit this
opportunity either by transacting directly in the market or by selling the information. Thus, the knowledgeable person (possessing the information)
14
Stigler, for example, argues: "There is no imperfection in a market possessing
incomplete knowledge if it would not be remunerative to acquire (produce) complete
knowledge. Information costs are the costs of transportation from ignorance to omniscience, and seldom can a trader afford to take the entire trip." (George J. Stigler,
"Imperfections in the Capital Markets," Journal of Political Economy (June 1963), p.
291, as quoted in Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External A c c o u n t i n g , " p. 20).
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will, through his own action, help to eliminate inefficiency in the market.
However, while it is true that any new existing information is apt to be
impounded eventually through an arbitrage mechanism, this mechanism may
not be the most desirable process through which information should get
impounded in market prices. This is particularly true from the standpoint of
social optimum (considering both allocative and distributive criteria). The
undesirability can result for several reasons:
1. Assuming that inside information exists,15 there is uncertainty about
the length of time needed for the arbitrage process to rectify the allocative
inefficiency (resulting from nonpublic availability of the information). Since
the time lapse is likely to be greater than it would be if such information were
required to be immediately available to the public, the allocative inefficiency
is apt to continue for a longer time period than if such a requirement were
made.
2. Insiders possessing information not available to the public or superior forecasting ability are likely to cause the information to be impounded
in market prices with less efficiency than if they were to make the information
immediately available to the public. This is likely to be the case for at
least two reasons. First, they may not have the sufficient capital immediately
available to carry out the volume of trading necessary to rectify the inefficiency. Second, they are not likely to have a comparative advantage in selling
information or in offering portfolio management services. In comparison,
if such information were required to be made immediately available through
the accounting system, the process is likely to be more efficient, since there
is a greater likelihood that individuals with sufficient capital and those who
possess comparative advantage in selling information would be included
among the recipients of the information.
3. The likelihood of a single individual or a small knowledgeable
group being able to interpret inside information properly is less than the
likelihood of the same information being ably interpreted if it were available
to many persons and many groups, i.e., if it were publicly available. In other
words, the greater the number of participating rivals in the marketplace, the
more efficient is the process of competitive equilibrium.
4. Finally, the prospect of insiders becoming wealthier may not be
palatable to those for whom criteria for desirable distribution of wealth are
considered to be important.
Existing Incentives to Communicate
Desirable Information
It is assumed in the efficient market literature,16 that the existence of
super-analysts will eventually insure that actual market prices are, on the
15
Some evidence on the existence of inside information is provided by Myron
Scholes in " A Test of the Competitive Market Hypothesis: The Market for New Issues
and Secondary Offerings" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1969).
16

See, for example, Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices,"
of Business (January 1965), pp. 34-105.
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basis of all available information, best estimates of intrinsic values. But
notice that the identity, on the average, between security prices and the
intrinsic value ultimately depends on the ability to consistently predict the
appearance of new information and the subsequent prediction of its impact
on intrinsic values. Suppose there is new information which is neither made
available to sophisticated traders nor predictable on the basis of presently
known information (possibly because it does not fit into the familiar pattern
of information dependencies learned by the analyst). It is conceivable that,
had this information been made available, the stock price would have been
changed as a result of impounding the content of the new information. It
could be argued that, since equilibrium is reached in the absence of this
information and the relative wealth of the investors is preserved, it is not
crucial that the new information be reflected in actual prices. However, in
that event, resource allocation is sub-optimal. Thus, from the standpoint of
stating accounting objectives, the relevant questions are:
1. What are the likely sources that possess new information which may
not be made immediately available publicly?
2. Does the existing market system provide incentives for those sources
to make the information available?
A likely source of new information is the firm itself. The new information
consists of prospective cash flows that result from the decisions and plans
being made continuously within the firm. 17 These plans and decisions are
first known to the management; they are the endogenous factors—peculiar
to the firm—responsible for the firm's unique rate of return. Because management is the first to know its plans, it is also the first to make a prediction
of the cash flows that result from these decisions. Thus, by systematically
and periodically communicating expectations of cash flows, management
can provide valuable information that is not, at the present time, made available systematically.
The second question can best be examined by considering the system
of incentives offered by the market that may induce the provision of such
information with and without disclosure laws.
Incentives for Producing and Communicating
Information in the Absence of Disclosure Laws
This question was investigated directly by Fama and Laffer18 and indirectly by Hirshleifer. 19 In spite of the different approaches, the two discussions reach many of the same conclusions. Since Fama and Laffer's

17
While management's expectations of these flows may be communicated publicly,
they are not part of the systematic and periodic accounting reports and they are
generally communicated in an ad hoc and sporadic fashion at the present time.
18
Eugene F. Fama and Arthur B. Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets,"
of Business (July 1971), pp. 289-298.

Journal

19
Jack Hirshleifer, "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive
Activity," American Economic Review (September 1971), pp. 561-574.
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discussion is, however, more germane to the role of information produced
by the firm vis-a-vis other sources, it is used as a basis for discussion. Their
main conclusions are briefly stated, and their underlying assumptions are
examined.
The Fama and Laffer Conclusions
And Assumptions
Fama and Laffer conclude that the production of information for trading
purposes only 20 is not consistent with Pareto optimality. The production and
communication of this information is costly since it uses resources merely
to redistribute wealth and not to generate it. Thus "investors as a whole
would be better off (and the producer would be no worse off) if they could
simply pay the monopolist in order to induce him not to produce information
"21
Since high transaction costs are associated with such side payments,
the authors predict that, in general, there will be some socially sub-optimal
information output. Other conclusions of interest are as follows:
1. In equilibrium there will be a single producer of a certain type of
information about a firm, and when this producer is an independent outsider
(vis-a-vis the firm) his profits will always be greater if he sells the information
rather than use it for his own trading.
2. Under competitive conditions of producing information, a producer
can cover his costs only by selling to investors.
3. As a rule, under monopolistic conditions information will be sold.
4. When a firm produces information about itself, it produces less than
an independent outsider, since the firm considers the effects of its information production on the firm's shareholders.
5. In the interests of its shareholders, the firm has strong incentives
to have all the information produced at its discretion.
20
That is, information that neither reduces risk, thus reducing the supply of a nondesirable commodity, nor improves operating decisions of the firm—thus bringing
about savings in resources through their improved allocation. The authors concentrate
on "information, as yet unavailable to the market, about decisions already m a d e "
("Information and Capital Markets," p. 291) that affects investor trading profits as a
result of private access to new information. This type of information parallels what
Hirshleifer ("Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity," pp.
563-564) describes as prior information about the true states of the world in a simplified
world of pure exchange, in which all productive transformations among entities and
commodities are ruled out and in which the endowments of individuals can be modified
only by trading. This is the type of information that can affect only the wealth distribution and not the resource allocation.
21
Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets," p. 294. While Fama and
Laffer discuss the incentives to produce information under both monopolistic, c o m petitive and partially competitive environments, the thrust of the conclusion is not
significantly affected by the economic environment assumed. In all environments, it
is concluded that socially sub-optimal information will tend to be produced, and only
the extent of sub-optimality and the identity of the producer may be affected.
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In summary, Fama and Laffer conclude that, except in the case of
monopoly or partial monopoly, and when the monopolistic producer is an
independent outsider rather than the firm itself,22 the firm will tend to produce
information about itself and prevent others from doing so.
The Fama and Laffer assumptions of primary concern to our discussion
are as follows:
1. Firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets, and the
capital market is perfect in the sense of zero transaction costs (costless
access to publicly available information) and the existence of perfect substitutes for the firm's securities.
2. Investors can trade in the market without identifying themselves as
possessing new information.
3. Investors have "homogeneous expectations" in that they agree on
the implications of any given information set for the equilibrium prices of
securities.
4. A seller of new information insists that the purchaser guarantee
against resale of the information.
Moreover, it is assumed that any potential producer of information
about a firm knows the probability distribution of market value changes
associated with different levels of information expenditures, and that—
should these distributions have a zero mean—this fact is costless information.
As a result, market prices impound it, and the consequence of going from
zero to some positive level of expenditure is a probability distribution of
market value that has a zero mean.
Implications for Accounting
To examine the implications of the conclusions for the need to specify
accounting alternatives, assume first that the firm is the sole producer of
information. If the firm is a monopolistic producer, it will benefit its shareholders by enabling them to sell their stock in the case of negative foreknowledge information. Positive information would eventually come to light
anyway and will not affect the expected gain to the firm's shareholders. But
in the case of discovery information 23 the firm will release positive information
and either suppress negative information or give shareholders the oppor-

22
Which is an unlikely situation when the type of information produced is one
that relates to a firm's specific events (see discussion below). Moreover, Fama and
Laffer state that " t h e firm is not limited to direct competition with independent
producers for sales to outsiders, since the cost to an outsider of producing information about a firm is likely to be somewhat in the firm's control." ("Information and
Capital Markets," p. 298.)
23
The dichotomy between foreknowledge and discovery information was first
made by Hirshleifer ("Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive
Activity"). Foreknowledge consists of events that will become known whether or not
information about them is generated. Discovery involves things that would not become
known without information production.
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tunity to sell before the information reaches the market.24
When information generation is competitive, the firm will prevent entry
by independent producers, give its information output to its shareholders,
and recover its costs entirely from sales to outsiders. In this case, since the
information will be available both to the firm's shareholders and to outsiders,
no investors will have expected trading gains. In the case of partial monopoly,
the firm will act like a monopoly with respect to incremental information that
the firm produces for which the marginal cost is below that of the next
cheapest producer.
Thus, except for the case of competitive generation of information 25
there are likely to be trading gains or losses, i.e., redistribution of wealth.
In the absence of a requirement with respect to immediate dissemination of
information generated or known to the firm, and given all the Fama and Laffer
assumptions, 26 there are incentives that induce firms and outsiders either
to sell information or to trade on its basis—thus causing redistribution of
wealth. This shift of wealth may violate social distributive criteria of welfare
aside from waste of resources. Thus, a requirement that information known
to the firm must be disseminated can help in preventing shifts of wealth that
could be socially undesirable even when the information produced is
assumed to have no allocative effects.
It is apparent from the foregoing that production of information which
has allocative effects 27 may be consistent with Pareto optimality in the sense
that the benefits resulting from production decisions based on the information
generated may well exceed the costs of producing the information. Indeed,
given the Fama and Laffer assumptions, both the firm and outside independent producers would have the incentive to generate the information
and either act upon it or sell it.28
It now becomes important to carefully examine the Fama and Laffer
assumptions to determine whether, indeed, there is enough incentive to
generate socially beneficial information that has allocative effects. Indeed,
it seems unlikely that any information would have only a distributive effect
and would not improve production decisions or the consumption-investment
opportunities of individuals. For example, positive information (whether

24
Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets,"
case of discovery information, negative information may
where discovery information has allocative effects (in that
ating decisions), on the other hand, it probably would
causing sub-optimality even under the strict assumptions

p. 294. Notice that in the
be suppressed. In a case
it leads to improved opernot be disseminated, thus
made by Fama and Laffer.

25
As indicated, this is unlikely with respect to the firm-specific information since
the firm has first access to the transactions giving rise to such information.
26

"Information and Capital Markets."

27

Notice that Fama and Laffer postulated that discovery information may well be
of the type that can improve production, i.e., have allocative effects.
28
Except in the case of negative discovery information which, once
may be suppressed by the firm.
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generated,

foreknowledge or discovery) released by the firm will bring about a positive
revision in the prices of securities which in turn would reduce the cost of
capital-raising. This, in itself, is bound to have an effect on resource allocation decisions within the firm.
The assumption that the capital market is perfect and that producing
firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets is needed so that
information about a specific firm will not affect the consumption-investment
opportunities of individuals except through its effects on their wealth. This
is analogous to Hirshleifer's assumption of pure exchange 29 in which only
the endowment vector of individuals, rather than production, is affected by
the information generated. But information about a product or an industry
is likely to affect consumption-investment opportunities through its implications for changes in relative prices. Thus, in the case of nonperfectly competitive product markets or a nonperfect capital market or in the case where
information is generated about an industry rather than about a single firm,
the information generation will probably affect consumption-investment opportunities of investors, and thus affect the reallocation of resources and not
merely the distribution of wealth. 30
Another set of assumptions that is not likely to hold is (a) that investors
can trade without indicating that they possess new information and (b) that
the seller of new information insists that the purchaser guarantee against
resale of the information. The first assumption (nonidentifiability of a possessor of new information) insures that returns from exclusive access to
information can be maximized. Through the second assumption other potential purchasers can be guaranteed exclusive access to the information sold.
To the extent that either of these assumptions does not hold, which is the
likely case, the incentive to generate and to communicate new information is
significantly lessened. It is usually difficult to observe the selling of information about a firm, especially accounting information. Accounting information
is provided at zero price. This is probably so because the transaction costs
of guaranteeing exclusive access to the information and of maintaining the
unidentifiability of the possessor of new information are very high.31
Even if information were sold at a positive price, the ability of the
resulting price to provide an appropriate signal and incentive for the genera-

29

"Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity."

30

These are probably the situations that Hirshleifer considers as " t h e more realistic
regime in which production and exchange both take place." (Hirshleifer, "Private
and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity," p. 566.)
31
While information in the nature of "consulting advice" is sold by consulting and
management-services firms, the costs of policing the right and the exclusive access
of the purchaser to the information are much smaller than those associated with
guaranteeing access to information in the nature of " f a c t s " about a firm. This is
particularly true if we allow for heterogeneous expectations governing at the market
place so that there is disagreement about the implications of facts. The interpretive
processing by " a d v i s o r s " can be viewed like any other commodity that commands
a non-zero price in the market.
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tion of information would be very limited. This is so because the ability to
enforce the right to exclusive access to the information purchased determines,
to a significant extent, the value of that information and its price. The ability
of such enforcement is likely to be very limited in the case of information
about a firm (including accounting information), and thus the private benefit
for the seller is apt to be significantly below the social benefit.32
The observance of zero prices for information about a firm (primarily
accounting information) and the regulation of the amount and nature of
information to be included in reports issued by the firm about itself are
consistent with the assumption that the costs of policing information are excessively high. In other words, the reason that accounting information is
presently regulated is probably because the property policing costs are too
high to allow the market to generate accurate information on the social
benefits of accounting information. In this situation, the SEC's, or preferably
the profession's, determination of the objectives and nature of desirable
accounting information may be the most practical way of coping with the
nonfeasibility of guaranteeing exclusive access to information about the firm,
just as government non-price rationing may be the most practical way of
coping with high exchange costs. It should be noted, however, that the SEC's
or the profession's rationing of information about the firm is costly and only
second best to a market in which exchange and enforcement costs were low.
Regulation, essentially a political process, would result in less efficiency
than reliance on a market with low transaction costs. But, in the absence of
the latter, regulation may be the only efficient way of ascertaining the social
value of information about a firm unless the cost of regulation per se exceeds
the benefits from rationing, in which case regulation should be eliminated. 33
Finally, the assumption of homogeneous expectations makes possible
the proposition that there can be general agreement on the probability distributions of market value changes associated with different information
expenditures and, if these have non-zero means, market prices will adjust
unbiasedly. Once we allow for heterogeneous expectations, this will not
hold and the likelihood that incentives for generating information would exist
will not be assessable.
If the above assumptions do not hold there may not be incentives in
the market for generating information nor for overproducing information. In
this case, and when the information has allocative effects (i.e., when information affects resource allocation for productive purposes), the systems of
incentives presently provided in the market may not induce the generation
and communication of socially desirable information.

32
For a lucid discussion of issues related to the impact of enforceability of rights
to property on prices, see Harold Demsetz, " T h e Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, VII (October 1964), pp. 11-26.
33

This " t r u i s t i c " statement merely indicates the desirability of an extensive c o s t /
benefit study of accounting information regulation. Such a study itself is not costless.
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Effects of Disclosure Rules
We now examine the possible effects of disclosure laws and regulation
of information on the incentive for producing information about firms. If
information that could potentially be produced by a firm has only distributive
effects (e.g., for trading purposes), the present disclosure laws may lead to a
social optimum. 34 If the firm is a monopolistic producer of information it will
generally lose its incentive to produce the information, since under the disclosure regulations it is prohibited from discriminating in favor of its shareholders or from selling the information. This is also the case when the firm
is able to produce the same information that an outside producer can generate at a lower cost. But as Fama and Laffer comment, 35 there may be
situations in which the disclosure laws can lead to inefficiencies in the sense
that an outsider produces information that the firm could produce more
cheaply were it not for the disclosure law that destroys the firm's incentive
to produce. A more detailed analysis of the effect of the particular disclosure
law in existence may help to clarify these points. For this purpose it will be
assumed that the information discussed has potential allocative effects.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, profits made within six
months by a firm's officers through trading in the firm's stock inures to the
firm [Section 78p(b) of the 15th U.S. Code], Moreover, Rule 10b-5 (of Title 240
of the Code of Federal Regulations) prohibits the use of manipulative and
deceptive devices, which are broadly construed to include making "any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." Rule 10b-6 of the same regulation prohibits trading
in securities by parties interested in their distribution.
Under these rules a firm's officer, who is either in the possession of
information or of the means to produce information which is either not likely to
be revealed by an alternative source outside the firm within a period of six
months 36 or whose effect on price is expected to persist beyond six months,
would have an economic incentive to maximize his gains from the information by either trading in the stock himself or by selling the information
to potential traders. (Notice that the law does not affect profits made through
trading within a period that exceeds six months.) This does not mean that
such an attempt to capitalize on information is costless. The attempt may be
34

See Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets," p. 298.
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Ibid.
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The information could not likely be revealed by an outside source either if the
insider has monopolistic access to it (as a result of his position or decision-making
function within the firm) or because the insider can produce the information more
cheaply, thus enabling him to deter the production by outsiders. Notice that much of
the relevant information possessed by firm insiders is an already manufactured byproduct of decision-making within the firm (e.g., cash flow forecasts necessary to make
investment or divestment decisions), and the marginal costs of producing this information for the firm insider (or decision-maker) is zero.
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strictly illegal under Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6, and the expected consequences
of illegal action must be perceived as part of the cost of trading or of otherwise selling the information by the insider. In addition to this cost, there is
the risk of the insider being held liable for misleading the firm's stockholders,
thus jeopardizing his position in the firm.
At any rate, the incentive for acting on inside information that is likely
to be profitable within a period exceeding six months is greater than the
incentive to act upon the information whose usefulness is limited to a period
of six months, since in the latter case the profits—by law—would inure to the
firm. To the extent that the insider acts upon it, the information will eventually
be impounded in market prices 37 thus securing allocative efficiency. Such
trading, however, would violate the distributive goals implied in the Securities
Exchange Act.
When the profits from using information are expected to be made if
trading is completed within a period of six months, firm insiders would have
no economic incentive to trade in the firm's stock, since the profit from
trading will inure to the firm. An insider can, of course, sell the information
to outsiders (not including the firm's shareholders since a major shareholder
of the firm is also considered as an insider by the law), although the transaction costs of selling such information to outsiders are apt to be high both
economically and legally (due to Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6). To the extent
that insiders would sell such information in spite of the economic and legal
costs, the information will be impounded in prices, although in the process
some resources will be wasted through higher costs (as well as through
increased risk to the sellers). To the extent that insiders would be deterred
from selling information in this case, there may still be an incentive to generate the information (if it is not already known) and to make it available.
In the absence of a direct economic incentive for the insider either to trade
or sell the information, it would be to his benefit to make it available to the
firm's shareholders so as to enable them to maximize their wealth and thus
indirectly reinforce the insider.
But a distinction must be made between positive information (i.e.,
information which if known will push stock prices up) and negative information (information which if known will bring prices down). If the information
is positive, it benefits the shareholders if the information is made publicly available immediately since the market value of their holdings 38 will be increased.
In fact, firms' officers do seem to make positive information available immediately through press releases, analysts' conferences, and speeches. Such

37
Subject to the inefficiencies that may result from communicating the information
through insiders' actions for profit maximizing purposes versus immediately making
the information available publicly, as discussed earlier.
38
In the case of foreknowledge, the only benefits of immediately making available
positive information from the point of view of shareholders is temporal, i.e., the price
increase occurs immediately rather than later in time. In the case of discovery information, however, the benefits consist of the total increase in wealth as a result of
prices going up, since if information is not generated and communicated, it will not
be known.
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releases tend to be timed shortly before new issues or secondary issues of
securities are offered even though this practice is illegal. This is understandable since the impact on prices of new information tends to reduce the firm's
cost of raising capital. From the point of view of social optimal allocation, the
public may be able to make more informed allocation decisions if specific
information about a firm is periodically and systematically released so that it
can be compared with information about other firms released at about the
same time. The social benefit of such presentation which enables this comparison across firms may well exceed the private benefits perceived to inure
to the firm as a result of such periodic reports. Thus, the firm may not have
an incentive to communicate its information in such a manner, although such
periodic and systematic communication—in addition to facilitating the comparison across firms—could enable potential investors to monitor and audit
the information and thus assess its reliability.
In the case of negative information, the firm will have no economic
incentive to make the information public. 39 It is again useful to make the
distinction, however, between foreknowledge and discovery information. In
the case of foreknowledge, since the information will become known later
to the public, the firm will have an incentive to generate the information and
make it known to its shareholders so that they can avoid capital losses by
selling their stock. Because of the existence of the disclosure law, however,
such trading will not enable shareholders to avoid losses. Since positive
knowledge will only produce temporal benefits, the incentive to the firm for
generating and communicating foreknowledge would be substantially reduced
in cases where a disclosure law does not exist. Positive knowledge, being
foreknowledge, will become known and inure to the benefit of shareholders
anyway.40 When negative information is already generated as a by-product
at zero marginal cost (as in the case of forecasts necessary to make decisions which have to be made anyhow), such negative information will neither
be acted upon by shareholders (in view of the law) nor publicly revealed
(assuming that the firm will run the risk associated with Rule 10b-5).
In the case of discovery information, the incentive for the firm to produce
the information will be provided only through the positive information, since
negative information will be suppressed (assuming again that the firm is
willing to run the risk associated with Rule 10b-5). Positive information will
be immediately made available so as to increase shareholders' wealth as
soon as possible. Thus, the disclosure law is likely to exert only a small
impact on inhibiting the production of discovery information. 41
39
Except for the risk associated with not disclosing known negative
due to Rule 10b-5 of Title 240, as explained above.

information

40
But the identity of the benefitting shareholders may change between the point of
time at which the foreknowledge would otherwise have been generated and the point
of time at which it becomes publicly known. In that case, the temporal benefits referred to above and foregone as a result of late generation of the information would
include wealth transfer from potential to existing shareholders.
41
This slightly inhibiting effect results from whatever impact Rule 10b-5 will have
on the likelihood that the firm will suppress negative information.
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However if, as is likely, most of the insider information is foreknowledge
(being results of decisions and actions already taken by a firm), it is highly
likely that the net effect of the disclosure law will be to inhibit the processing
and communication of insider information. To the extent that inside information has potentially beneficial allocative effects, the net effect of the disclosure
law would be harmful since it will not reveal information that improves the
allocation of resources. Hence, the consideration of requiring, through regulation or through specification of objectives, that inside information be
periodically and systematically processed and communicated may well be
worthwhile.
Conclusions
Considering the existing theory and evidence related to efficient markets,
the choice among accounting alternatives cannot be determined solely
through the examination of market price reactions to accounting information.
Explicit formulation of accounting objectives is needed.
Market incentives, even in the absence of present disclosure laws, may
not be sufficient to insure the production and communication of economically
useful information. The existing disclosure laws aggravate the problem and
seem to reduce the incentive to produce and disseminate useful information.
To the extent that information has potential allocative effects outside the
firm, the existence of a disclosure law may be suboptimal because the firm
would lack the incentive to produce information that could make resource
allocation more efficient. Thus, present disclosure laws that prohibit the
firm from selling information or from benefitting its shareholders vis-a-vis
others can destroy the incentive to produce economically useful information.
Presumably, the intent of present disclosure laws is primarily to prevent
undesirable redistribution of wealth that could result from monopolistic access
to information. In the process, however, the overall magnitude of wealth
may be lessened as a result of impeding the production of desirable signals
for resource allocation. If the wealth-distribution goal implied in the disclosure law is taken for granted, regulation of what information is to be produced and disclosed by a firm is needed to insure that information useful for
allocation decisions is produced by a firm.
In other words, if present disclosure laws must continue to exist to
satisfy wealth distribution and other goals, additional regulation of accounting information by the private and/or governmental sectors seems warranted
to nullify the adverse effect that the present laws may have on the production
and communication of economically useful accounting information. Moreover, even if present laws are abrogated, market forces still do not seem to
provide sufficient incentives for the production of useful information, thus
implying that regulation appears necessary. The formulation of accounting
objectives, preferably by the accounting profession and other directly involved
parties, is a preliminary and a necessary step for such regulation.
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